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This paper examines the impact of various farm and household characteristics (such as farm 
size, the off-farm employment status, the farm operator's age and schooling and the number of 
family members) on the level as well as the dynamics of on-farm diversification. Using linked 
census data for Upper-Austria from 1980, 1985 and 1990 we provide evidence that smaller 
farms are more specialised and also tend to increase the degree of specialisation over time 
more quickly than large farms. A significantly lower degree of diversification (higher degree 
of specialisation) as well as a stronger reduction in diversification over time is also reported 
for businesses operated by older, less educated, part-time farm operators. The analysis of 
diversification dynamics also suggests that (a) farms adjust to changes in their environment by 
steadily approaching their long-run equilibrium level of diversification (β-convergence), and 
(b) the variance of the diversification distribution declines over time (σ-convergence). 
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Determinants and Dynamics of Farm Diversification 
 
Abstract:  
This paper examines the impact of various farm and household characteristics (such as farm 
size, the off-farm employment status, the farm operator's age and schooling and the number of 
family members) on the level as well as the dynamics of on-farm diversification. Using linked 
census data for Upper-Austria from 1980, 1985 and 1990 we provide evidence that smaller 
farms are more specialised and also tend to increase the degree of specialisation over time 
more quickly than large farms. A significantly lower degree of diversification (higher degree 
of specialisation) as well as a stronger reduction in diversification over time is also reported 
for businesses operated by older, less educated, part-time farm operators. The analysis of 
diversification dynamics also suggests that (a) farms adjust to changes in their environment by 
steadily approaching their long-run equilibrium level of diversification (β-convergence), and 
(b) the variance of the diversification distribution declines over time (σ-convergence). 
 
1. Introduction 
Typically, firms produce more than one product. In this sense their production is diversified. 
After a wave of intense diversification in the sixties and seventies, especially in the United 
States but also in Europe, the eighties and nineties have seen a mitigation or even a reversal of 
this trend. Nevertheless, the diversified (multi product) firm still is the rule rather than the 
exception in the modern industrial sector (Montgomery, 1994) and analysing the determinants 
of diversification remains a busy field of research in strategic management and industrial 
organisation (Briglauer, 2000). 
In contrast to large corporate firms in the non-farm economy, where the wide dispersion of 
ownership helps to spread business risk over numerous stockholders, the smaller family farms 
in agriculture have little capacity for this kind of risk reduction given that a large share of the 
family's and the farm operator's wealth as well as their labour capacity is allocated to their 
own (farm) business. It is well known that on-farm product diversification (diversification of 
farm production activities) can be an efficient mechanism for dealing with risk by stabilising 
expected returns in an uncertain environment and the analysis of this issue already has a long 
tradition in agricultural economics.
1  
Despite the frequent observation that diversification plays an important role in agriculture, 
only few empirical studies on the determinants of farm diversification are available. The 
limited number of econometric studies on diversification using micro-data are confined to the 
U.S. situation and focus on the relationship between diversification and farm size. White and 
Irwin (1972), using aggregate U.S. Census Data, compare diversification across farm size 
classes and conclude that larger farms are more specialised. The opposite finding is reported 
in Pope and Prescott (1980). Investigating the relationship between farm size as well as other 
socio-economic variables and four different measures of diversification for more than 1,000 
                                                           
1    Nearly half a century has passed since Heady noticed: “the topic of diversification as a means of 
handling uncertainty is an old one in agricultural economics” (1952, p. 483). Recently, this issue seems 
to have gained renewed interest (Quiroz, and Valdés, 1995; Martin, and McLeay, 1998) not least due to 
the liberalisation of agricultural policies and the globalisation of agricultural markets. In the past, 
government market interventions have caused domestic prices to vary substantially less than 
international ones (Hazell et al., 1990). As domestic prices start following international price signals 
more closely, farmers (as well as those working on policies concerned with their welfare) are forced to 
consider the implications of larger fluctuations in commodity prices. In a recent survey on farmers’ 
exposure to income risk under the 1996 farm bill Knutson et al. (1998) stress the high ranking of 
diversification as a risk-management tool.   3
Californian Crop farms, they find "a strong indication of a positive relationship between 
diversification and size" (p. 554). In analysing data on 2,192 farms across three U.S. regions, 
Sun, Jinkins and El-Osta (1995) finally distinguish between different "stages of 
diversification", which are found to influence the relationship between size and 
diversification. 
Although these studies differ substantially in the empirical approach used as well as in the 
results reported, two common characteristics are to be mentioned. Firstly, they consider farm 
production diversification only and do not control for the impact of additional off-farm 
income. As pointed out in Pope and Prescott, the exclusion of the off-farm employment status 
may introduce a bias in the parameter estimates (in particular of the farm size variable). Given 
that additional off-farm income is one form of diversification to reduce risk and considering 
the well established empirical observation that smaller farms are more likely to have 
additional off-farm income, one would expect the parameter estimate of farm size (in a model 
not controlling for the off-farm employment status) to be biased upwards. And secondly, the 
existing empirical literature has not yet considered the dynamics of farmer's diversification 
behaviour. Using cross-sectional data implies interpreting the results as long-run equilibrium 
relationship and does not allow to investigate the actual adjustment of farmers to changes in 
economic conditions. Concerning the importance of analysing diversification in a dynamic 
context White and Irwin observe: “Most existing firms are thus a product of past conditions 
which mandated diversified production. Their present status determines where they should 
go” (p.210).  
This paper examines the determinants and dynamics of farm production diversification in 
Upper Austria empirically. Using panel data for individual farm households, we (i) focus on 
the importance of additional off-farm employment as an explanatory variable in addition to a 
number of characteristics of the farm and the farm operator as well as (ii) explicitly consider 
changes in the degree of diversification of individual farms over time.  
The following section 2 provides a summary of economic rationales for firm (farm) 
diversification. Section 3 describes the data and the definitions of the variables, section 4 
reports the empirical results and the final section 5 summarises and concludes. 
 
2. Motives for firm (farm) diversification 
Theoretical models offer many different arguments about why firms diversify. These 
arguments can be divided into three groups: the market power-, the synergy-, and the agency 
view.
2 The market power approach considers possible anticompetitive strategies (such as 
cross subsidisation or reciprocal buying) employed by diversified firms in pursuit of 
increasing profits. The higher probability for multi product firms to interact simultaneously 
with a specific competitor in different markets facilitates reciprocal buying or to take 
advantage of their conglomerate interdependence by forming collusive outcomes. While this 
explanation may be important in many industries, it is of little relevance when applied to the 
agricultural sector being characterised by a large number of small family farms.  
Synergy effects refers to cost advantages that emerge from the existence of joint production 
facilities. If it is cheaper to produce several goods jointly instead of producing each of them 
separately, the cost function exhibits "economies of scope". Although one finds unanimous 
approval concerning the definition of the synergy concept,
3 the sources of economies of scope 
are not so easy to identify. In addition to purely technical synergies referring to the 
complementarity or supplementarity for the products when they are produced in combination 
                                                           
2   The following section draws heavily on Briglauer (2000). 
3   Baumol et al. (1982) formalised this concept in an extensive treatise.    4
(Heady, 1952) a lot of attention is devoted to operational synergies focusing on shared input 
facilities and excess capacity in the presence of demand constraint). If the firms’ current 
production of one product is too low to fully employ its fixed inputs, this excess capacity can 
be utilised productively by entering into other markets.
4 Financial synergies shift attention 
away from the operational side of the firm but create economies of scope by lowering capital 
costs. Two arguments are frequently proposed in the literature: Firstly, the possibility to erect 
internal capital markets, which reallocate firm capital based on efficiency considerations. 
Secondly, by lowering the variability of firms profits, diversification might positively affect 
the firms’ capital costs because investors tend to be risk-averse.  
The third group of theoretical arguments focuses on the principal-agent relationship between 
corporate managers and shareholders. This agency relationship is fraught with opportunistic 
managerial behaviour that leads to serious conflicts, in the sense that managers follow 
strategies that do not come up to the interests of shareholders. Specifically, managerial 
economists
5 maintain that the separation of ownership and control enables management to 
enforce utility maximising behaviour (instead of profit maximisation). It is argued that 
managerial utility is determined by the growth of firm size, whereby the growth rate stands 
proxy for managerial perquisites, monetary rewards, prestige or other non-economic motives. 
Given that demand restrictions in existing product markets limit the rate of firm growth, firms 
have an incentive to diversify into new, faster growing markets.  
A similar line of reasoning (Amihud and Lev (1981)) states that risk averse managers favour 
diversification programs, because manager's risk is closely related to the variation in firm 
performance through employment contracts that contain forms of profit sharing. Consequently 
managers benefit from diversification strategies that generate more stable streams of income. 
With reference to the agricultural sector this argument (together with synergy effects) seems 
to have the strongest appeal. As the role of the owner and the manager coincide within family 
farms (the “manager” receives all the rewards of his efforts), the farm operator has a strong 
incentive to spread personal risks by diversification of farm production.  
 
3. Data and definition of variables 
The empirical approach in the present paper is based on a panel of more than 50,000 Upper 
Austrian farm households for three years, 1980, 1985, and 1990. Upper Austria, which is the 
third largest state in Austria (14.3% of area and 17.2% of population) borders Germany and 
the Czech Republic. It is one of three major agricultural regions in Austria and is primarily 
devoted to dairy production. While 19% of all farms are located here, these farms own 29% of 
all livestock in Austria.  
For each year, the farm census collects extensive information on the farm as well as some 
family characteristics such as age, sex, and schooling of various family members, and the off-
farm employment status. Given the importance of dairy farming in Upper Austria, our 
measures of size and diversification will be based on the number of livestock (measured in 
"median large animal units"). A median large animal unit is an index defined according to the 
live weight of an animal. A live weight of 650 kg (1,433 pounds) corresponds to one median 
large animal unit. This aggregate measure of farm size can be broken down into nine sub-
categories ("median large animal units" for: calfs, fattened cattle, cattle, piglets, sheeps and 
goats, chicken, cows, fattened pigs, and brood sow). Based on these nine product groups we 
                                                           
4   It is important to notice that these examples explain diversification only in cases, where contractual 
mechanisms fail to employ the free resources. In a world of zero transaction costs the above arguments 
have no merit since market contracts would be perfect substitutes for internal production arrangements. 
Teece (1980, 1982) identified input categories where it is reasonable to assume that market transaction 
costs outweigh transaction costs that arise within a multi product organisation. 
5   Most notably, Marris (1964), Baumol (1958) and Williamson (1967).   5





































is the quantity of the most important product in the group of all nine products (q
max = max(q1, 
q2, …, qn)) and n is the number of products (n = 9). Note that complete specialisation implies 
DC = DB = DE = 0, whereas the maximum level of diversification is given by DC = DB = 1 and 
DE = log(n). The properties of these measures of diversification are discussed in more detail in 
Hackbart and Anderson (1978) as well as Gollop and Monahan (1991).  
To guarantee a homogenous data base, the analysis is restricted to households that did not exit 
from the agricultural sector and reported all relevant information for estimating the equations. 
The farm households satisfying these criteria number 40,626. The definition and summary 
statistics of all variables used is reported in the Appendix.  
4. Empirical results 
The results of the instrumental-variable regression using the transformed entropy index (TDE) 
as a measure of farm diversification are reported in Table 1.
6 Four different models are 
reported. Column (1) has the results of a cross-section model for the 1990 farm census, which 
is similar to those estimated by Pope and Prescott (1980) and Sun, Jinkins and El-Osta (1995) 
but controls for the off-farm employment status. The parameter estimate of farm size (ln(S)) is 
significantly different from zero and positive.
7 A one standard deviation increase in ln(S) 
raises the entropy index by 47.48%.
8 This positive relationship between size and 
diversification (even when controlling for the off-farm employment status) confirms the 
findings of Pope and Prescott, large farms tend to be more diversified than smaller ones. 
As expected, the existence of additional off-farm income reduces the degree of 
diversification. If the married couple spends less than 50% of total working time on farm 
work and more than 50% on off-farm work (PT = 1), the entropy index is 6.12 percent below 
that of an otherwise identical full-time farm. Part-time farms will c.p. have less time to devote 
to the production of a broad agricultural product mix. Furthermore, and maybe more 
important, off-farm income has to be considered as one strategy to diversify employment risks 
and thus reduces the necessity to diversify on the farm.
9 
 
                                                           
6    Since the entropy index DE is bounded by zero and 0.95 (=ln(n)), one may be suspicious of the 
assumption of normality. Further, one may wish an estimator which ensures that predicted values for DE 
are in the interval (0, 0.95). A popular transformation to alleviate these problems is the logit 
transformation (Greene, 1997, p. 227f.) where the dependent variable becomes TDE = ln[DE/(1-DE)]. To 
prevent computational problems with the logit transformation where DE = 0, we used the following 
modification of the logit transformation TDE = ln[(DE+k)/(1-DE)], with k = 0.1. The econometric results 
when using TDB and TDC instead of TDE do not differ substantially (see Table A2 in the appendix), we 
thus conclude that the coeficients are not sensitive with respect to the measure of diversification. 
7   The size distribution of farms is skewed to the right with a skewness coefficient equal to 1.3 (Greene, 
1997, p.66). Given this skewed distribution the natural logarithm of farm size is used in the empirical 
analysis. 
8   Estimation experiments show a somewhat stronger positive impact of farm size when we did not control 
for the off-farm employment status. 
9   Considering off-farm employment as a strategy to reduce risk calls into question the assumption of 
exogeneity of the variable PT. We thus used information from the 1980 farm census as well as all other 
exogenous variables to instrument PT in Table 1.   6
Table 1:    Results of the instrumental-variable regression analysis on levels of and 
changes in the transformed entropy index. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
  Dependent Variable:  TDE  ∆TDE  ∆TDE  ∆TDE 
    all farms  all farms  full-time  part-time 
      farms only  farms only 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Independent Parameter  Parameter  Parameter.  Parameter 
Variable  (t-value) (t-value) (t-value) (t-value) 
(Symbol)  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Constant  -2.344 -1.082 -0.929 -1.419 
 (-89.29)  (-39.21)  (-27.16)  (-40.46) 
Farm size (ln(S)t)  0.415 0.114 0.094 0.144 
 (121.07)  (36.17)  (21.61)  (38.23) 
Part-time farm (PTt) -0.075  -0.143     
 (-5.80)  (-12.14)     
Schooling (EDUt)/100 0.015  0.039  -0.092  -0.065 
 (2.48)  (0.07)  (-0.14)  (-0.08) 
Age (AGEt)  -0.017 -0.044 -0.014 -0.069 
 (-1.57)  (-4.62)  (-1.13)  (-4.89) 
Number of family members (#FAMt)  0.020 0.017 0.013 0.021 
 (10.26)  (10.90)  (6.79)  (9.04) 
Gender (GENDERt)  0.068 0.015  -0.019 0.025 
 (7.95)  (1.75)  (-1.47)  (2.33) 
Marrital status (MARRt)  -0.019 0.078 0.038 0.077 
 (-1.94)  (8.21)  (3.40)  (5.44) 
Region 1 (R1)  -0.265 -0.167 -0.153 -0.094 
 (-12.90)  (-9.31)  (-7.54)  (-3.20) 
Region 2 (R2)  -0.090 -0.045 -0.031 -0.031 
 (-8.28)  (-4.76)  (-2.60)  (-2.24) 
Region 3 (R3)  -0.118 -0.029 -0.015 -0.038 
 (-9.84)  (-2.81)  (-1.09)  (-2.51) 
Region 4 (R4)  -0.146 -0.019  0.006 -0.042 
 (-14.06)  (-2.16)  (0.51)  (-3.11) 
Region 5 (R5)  -0.028 -0.014 -0.002 -0.026 
 (-3.01)  (-1.72)  (-0.19)  (-2.14) 
Hardshipzone 1 (HZ1)  -0.004 0.066 0.073 0.055 
 (-0.49)  (8.75)  (7.62)  (4.88) 
Hardshipzone 2 (HZ2)  0.017 0.066 0.078 0.053 
 (1.72)  (7.45)  (6.86)  (4.06) 
Hardshipzone 3 (HZ3)  0.045 0.075 0.066 0.077 
 (4.24)  (8.07)  (5.61)  (5.71) 
Hardshipzone 4 (HZ4)  0.263 0.083 0.296 0.035 
 (4.49)  (1.64)  (3.07)  (0.56) 
Table 1 to be continued   7
 
Diversification (TDEt)   -0.351 -0.232 -0.426 
   (-76.71)  (-38.81)  (-65.56) 
R2  0.453 0.138 0.094 0,169 





Log-Likelihood  -38,079.9 -32,306.6 -10,798.0 -20,335.7 
Restricted Log-Likelihood  -50,347.0 -35,351.6 -11,703.2 -22,446.9 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Remarks:  The degrees of freedom for the F-test are: a) 40,627; b) 18,055; and c) 22,555. The time index t of 
the explanatory variables refers to 1990 in column (1) and to 1985 in columns (2) to (4). 
 
Table 1 also suggests personal characteristics of the farm operator as well as the farm family 
to influence on-farm diversification. According to column (1), diversification significantly 
increases with the farm operators farm-specific schooling (EDU) and the number of family 
members living on the farm (#FAM). Management and coordination becomes more 
demanding as diversification of the farm increases. By improving managerial skills, schooling 
enables the farm operator to run a farm which is more diversified. The impact of age (AGE) is 
not significantly different from zero at the 10% level. If the farm operator is female 
(GENDER = 1) and is unmarried (MARR = 0), diversification is higher, the impact of the 
latter variable not being significantly different at the 5% level in column (1), however. Table 
1 also controls for the impact of regional characteristics (R1 to R5, and HZ1 to HZ4).  
A significant shortcoming of the existing empirical literature (and the results presented so far) 
is that they do not consider any dynamics of adjustment over time. Comparing the average 
entropy indices for 1985 and 1990 indicates, that farms have become more specialised, the 
average entropy index declined from 0.370 to 0.339. However, this decline in the average 
level of diversification is the result of an extremely heterogenous development at the 
individual farm-household level (see Figure 1). From all farms, 58.2% report a decline in the 
transformed entropy measure and the percentage of farms where diversification increases is 
38.9%.  
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∆TDE > 0: 38.9% 
∆TDE < 0: 58.2% 
∆TDE = 0:   2.9%   8
In order to investigate changes in diversification of individual farms, we compute first 
differences of the entropy measure for the period 1985 to 1990 to be used as a dependent 
variable in the regression models in columns (2), (3), and (4) of Table 1. 
The regression equation in column (2) is estimated on all farms. Columns (3) and (4) report 
parameter estimates from models using data for full-time and part-time farms only to allow 
different adjustment paths to the steady state for the two groups. The results in column (2) 
compare well with those reported in column (1). Most of the explanatory variables are 
significant and have the same sign as in the model explaining levels of diversification. 
Compared to column (1), the schooling (EDU) and gender (GENDER) variables now are 
insignificant, the parameter estimate for the age variable (AGE) is negative and significant 
and the farm operator's marrital status (MARR) now has a positive and significant impact. The 
parameter estimates reported in column (2) imply that older farm operators, working on small 
part-time farms with a small number of family members living on the farm are reducing the 
degree of diversification most. The significant and negative parameter estimate of the initial 
diversification level implies convergence of the farms towards their own steady state 
diversification level.  
A comparison of columns (3) and (4) indicates that the process of convergence differs 
between full-time and part-time farms. Based upon the parameter estimates of Table 1, Figure 
2 shows the adjustment paths for a hypothetical full-time as well as part-time farm (which are 
defined by taking mean and mode values of exogenous and continuous dummy variables 
respectively).  
Figure 2:  A phase diagram for hypothetical farm's diversification decisions (O unstable, O 
stable). 
Figure 2 suggests that for high levels of specialisation the adjustment in the entropy index for 
the hypothetical full-time and part-time farm is nearly identical, differences in adjustment are 
more pronounced for higher levels of diversification. Also note that farms characterised by 
average levels of diversification ( E D = 0.437 for full-time farms and  E D  = 0.317 for part-
time farms) will realise points on the adjustment paths (A and B) which are below the 
horizontal steady state line, indicating that farms on average tend to specialise over time. 
Furthermore, the adjustment path for the part-time farm is typically below that of the full-time 







































steady state line  9
finally suggests a higher steady state level of diversification for the full-time compared to the 
part-time farm. Starting from the average level of diversification for both farm types (in points 
A and B), the hypothetical full-time farm would move along the darker path and finally end up 
at point B' (with an entropy index of 0.295), whereas the hypothetical part-time farm would 
reduce the level of diversification more quickly along the lower path and move towards point 
A' (with an entropy index of 0.201).  
However, care is needed when inferring the behaviour of the total population of farms from 
the adjustment of two hypothetical farms. Figure 2 indicates that a farm with specific 
characteristics (hypothetical farm) converges towards its own steady state diversification level 
("β-convergence"). Farms with different characteristics will also converge towards a specific 
steady state level, which will be different from that of the hypothetical farm, however. To 
illustrate this, we compute the adjustment path of a larger than average full-time farm. Since 
larger farms are found to have significantly larger changes in diversification (see Table 1, 
column (3)), an increase in farm size will shift the adjustment path upwards. If we now 
compare the diversification behaviour of two farms with different farm sizes (the large and 
the average sized full-time farm) starting from the same initial entropy index (points C and B), 
we find that the larger farm converges towards point C ' whereas the average sized full-time 
farm converges towards point B'. The two farms diverge and the distribution of farms widens 
in this case, although both of them converge towards their own steady state diversification 
level. In order to assess changes in the distribution of diversification over time ("σ-
convergence" or "σ-divergence"), we thus simulate diversification adjustments for all farms in 
the census according to the estimated equations in Table 1. The resulting distributions of the 
entropy indices for full-time and part-time farms are shown in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3: Simulation results on the changing distribution of the entropy index. 
 
For both types of farms we observe a shift to the left, indicating that diversification will 
decrease and farms tend to specialise. Furthermore, Figure 3 suggests that the number of 
farms at the tails of the distribution decreases and that the distribution is squeezed. The 
reduction of the number of farms at the tails is more pronounced for part-time farms. 
Correspondingly, the variance of the entropy index for full-time farms declines from 0.026 at 
time t (in 1990) to 0.019 at t + 5, for part-time farms, the figures are 0.031 at time t and 0.017 



























Part-time farms t  10
5. Summary and Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of various farm and household 
characteristics (such as farm size, the off-farm employment status, the farm operator's age and 
schooling and the number of family members) on the level as well as the dynamics of on-farm 
diversification. Using linked census data for Upper-Austria from 1980, 1985 and 1990 we 
provide evidence that smaller farms are more specialised and also tend to increase the degree 
of specialisation over time more quickly than large farms. A significantly lower degree of 
diversification (higher degree of specialisation) as well as a stronger reduction in 
diversification over time is also reported for farms operated by older, less educated, part-time 
farm operators. The analysis of diversification dynamics furthermore suggests that (a) farms 
adjust to changes in their environment by steadily approaching their long-run equilibrium 
level of diversification (β-convergence), and (b) the variance of the diversification 
distribution declines over time (σ-convergence). The path of adjustment towards the new 
equilibrium level, however, again depends on farm characteristics.  
The observation that those farms, being considered as the fittest for surviving in the long run 
(large, full-time farms managed by a young farm operator) report the smallest increases in 
specialisation (the largest increases in diversification) suggests, that for this group of farms, 
the potential gains from realising economies of scale are not that important compared to the 
returns from risk reduction due to on-farm diversification. Given that the liberalisation of 
international agricultural markets will further increase the variability of domestic prices, one 
might expect the current trend towards specialisation of production to slow down or 
eventually be reversed, in particular, since those farms reporting to reduce diversification 
most quickly, have been found to face the highest probability of exiting from the agricultural 
sector (Weiss, 1999).  
Investigating the probability of farm exits simultaneously with the dynamics of diversification 
would be an important extension of the present empirical analysis insofar, as the results 
reported from the sample of surviving farms only might be biased due to sample selectivity. 
Similarly, one might wish to consider the issue of off-farm employment more carefully by 
estimating a simultaneous off-farm employment / diversification model. Finally, it is 
important to keep in mind that the continuous measures of diversification used here captures 
only one dimension of diversification. In comparing categorical and continuous measures, 
Hall and St. John (1994) for example conclude that the choice of measurement technique is 
important and will influence research results. Additionally applying categorical typologies of 
diversification thus would allow us to more carefully study and understand the determinants 
and dynamics of farm diversification.  
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Table A.1.Definition and Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Variable  Symbol  Part-time Farms  Full-time Farms  All Farms 
   Mean  Mean  Mean 
    (Std. Dev.)  (Std. Dev.)  (Std. Dev.) 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Number of Observations  N 22,200  18,072  40,115 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Farm size in 1985 is the Log  ln(S)i     6.3049    7.4726  6.8309 
of Livestock (measured in     (1.3177)    (0.9558)  (1.3006)  
Median Large Animal Units): 
Farm operators age in years  AGEi,85   1.805    1.0963  1.1434 
in 1985     (0.2983)    (0.2924)  (0.2979) 
Schooling  EDUi,85   0.3946    0.3793  0.3882 
       (0.4888)    (0.4852)  (0.4873) 
Part-time farming: married   PTi,85   1.0000    0.0000  0.5534 
couple spends more than 50% 
of total working time on off- 
farm employment.  
Dummy for farm operators  MARRi,85   0.8972   0.7589  0.8360 
married state (1=married;      (0.3037)   (0.4278)  (0.3703) 
0=unmarried)  
Number of family members  #FAMi,85   4.9369   5.0822  5.0058 
       (1.8684)    (2.0980)  (1.9744) 
Farm operators sex:   GENDERi,85   0.1817    0.1033  0.1464 
(0 = male, 1 = female) 
Region 1   R1   0.0220    0.0358  0.0278 
       (0.1466)    (0.1858)  (0.1645) 
Region 2   R2   0.1361    0.1609  0.1472 
       (0.3429)    (0.3674)  (0.3543) 
Region 3   R3   0.1012    0.0908  0.0966 
       (0.3016)    (0.2873)  (0.2954) 
Region 4   R4   0.1994    0.2374  0.2164 
       (0.3996)    (0.4255)  (0.4118) 
Region 5   R5   0.2565    0.2484  0.2529 
       (0.4367)    (0.4321)  (0.4347) 
Hardshipzone 1  HZ1   0.2553    0.2335  0.2460 
       (0.4360)    (0.4230)  (0.4307) 
Hardshipzone 2   HZ2   0.1447    0.1150  0.1316 
       (0.3518)    (0.3191)  (0.3381) 
Hardshipzone 3   HZ3   0.1276    0.1023  0.1164 
       (0.3337)    (0.3031)  (0.3207) 
Hardshipzone 4   HZ4   0.0041    0.0012  0.0028 
       (0.0635)    (0.0341)  (0.0525) 
Entropy Index of  DE90   0.2844    0.4113  0.3416 
Diversification1990     (0.1755)    (0.1604)  (0.1801) 
Entropy Index of  DE85   0.3190    0.4375  0.3725 
Diversification 1985     (0.1676)    (0.1496)  (0.1700) 
Transformed Entropy   TDE90   -0.7363    -0.1891  -0.4893 
Index of Diversification 1990     (0.8366)    (0.7178)  (0.8301) 
Transformed Entropy   TDE85   -0.5649    -0.0747  -0.3431 
Index of Diversification 1985     (0.7599)    (0.6463)  (0.7499) 
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Table A.2:   Results of the instrumental-variable regression analysis using the transformed 
diversification measures. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
  Dependent Variable:  TDC  TDB  TDE 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Independent Symbol  Parameter  Parameter.  Parameter 
Variable (t-value)  (t-value)  (t-value) 
    (1) (2) (3) 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Constant -2.419  -2.363  -2.344 
 (-82.54)  (-75.47)  (-89.29) 
Farm size  log(GVE) 0.409  0.469  0.415 
   (107.18)  (114.90)  (121.07) 
Part-time farm  PT -0.104  -0.038  -0.075 
   (-7.21)  (-2.47)  (-5.80) 
Schooling  EDU 0.019  0.021  0.015 
   (2.72)  (2.85)  (2.48) 
Age   AGE -0.031  -0.025  -0.017 
   (-2.53)  (-1.91)  (-1.57) 
Number of family members  #FAM 0.012  0.016  0.020 
   (5.75)  (7.15)  (10.26) 
Gender  GENDER 0.052  0.054  0.068 
   (5.41)  (5.29)  (7.95) 
Marrital status  MARR -0.012  -0.031  -0.019 
   (-1.07)  (-2.62)  (-1.94) 
Region 1  R1 -0.223  -0.249  -0.265 
   (-9.71)  (-10.18)  (-12.90) 
Region 2  R2 -0.071  -0.086  -0.090 
   (-5.87)  (-6.63)  (-8.28) 
Region 3  R3 -0.116  -0.122  -0.118 
   (-8.58)  (-8.52)  (-9.84) 
Region 4  R4 -0.145  -0.161  -0.146 
   (-12.53)  (-12.96)  (-14.06) 
Region 5  R5 -0.053  -0.053  -0.028 
   (-5.04)  (-4.66)  (-3.01) 
Hardshipzone 1  HZ1 0.001  0.009  -0.004 
   (0.03)  (0.87)  (-0.49) 
Hardshipzone 2  HZ2 0.013  0.028  0.017 
   (1.13)  (2.29)  (1.72) 
Hardshipzone 3  HZ3 0.028  0.054  0.045 
   (2.33)  (4.22)  (4.24) 
Hardshipzone 4  HZ4 0.247  0.281  0.263 
   (3.77)  (4.02)  (4.49) 
R2 0.396  0.416  0,453 
F-Test [16, 40.627]  1,667.7  1,810.6  2,108.6 
Log-Likelihood -42,558.5  -45,240.8  -38,079.9 
Restricted Log-Likelihood  -52,827.2 -56,188.4  -50,5374.0 